The Central Bank Independence Dataset is the most comprehensive data set on de jure central bank independence (CBI) available to date. The 2025 version of this dataset updates Garriga 2016 for statutory central bank independence. It includes country-year observations covering 192 countries between 1970 and 2023. This represents a 46% extension in the coverage of the original data release.
The dataset identifies the creation of central banks (9,123 observations) and statutory reforms affecting CBI and their direction (9,109 observations). It codes four dimensions of CBI: personnel independence, central bank’s objectives, policy formulation, and limits on lending. These variables are scored from 0 (no independence) to 1 (maximum independence) and aggregated into two overall CBI indices following Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) coding criteria. This version of the dataset introduces a regional diffusion variable, constructed as the yearly average of CBI weighted index (lvaw_garriga) in the following regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, Africa and Middle East, Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries, and Western Europe and North America.
Last updated by source: 2025-01-09
| Dataset type: | Time-Series |
| Dataset level: | Country |
(Garriga, 2025)
(Garriga, 2016)
CBI unweighted index: Raw average of the four components: Chief Executive Officer, Objectives, Policy Formulation and Limitations on lending to the government. It ranges from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) CBI.
More about this variableCBI weighted index: Weighted average of the four components (weights between parentheses), following Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti's (1992) criteria: Chief Executive Officer (0.20), Objectives (0.15), Policy Formulation (0.15), and Limitations on lending to the government (0.5). It ranges from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) CBI.
More about this variableComponent 1: Chief executive officer. Weighted average of the following variables (weights between parentheses): Term of office of CEO (0.25), Who appoints the CEO (0.25), Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25), CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25).
More about this variableComponent 4: Limitations on lending to the government. Weighted average of the following variables (weights between parentheses): Limitations on advances (0.30); Limitations on securitized lending (0.20); Who decides the terms of lending to government (0.20); Beneficiaries of central bank lending (0.10); Type of limits when they exist (0.05); Maturity of loans (0.05); Restrictions on interest rates (0.05); Prohibition on central bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05).
More about this variableComponent 2: Objectives. Central bank objectives as stated in the law (coding between parentheses): Price stability is the major or only objective, and in case of conflict with other objectives, the Central Bank has final authority (1); Price stability is the only objective (0.8); Price stability is one of the objectives, with other compatible objectives (0.6); Price stability is one of the objectives, with other potentially conflicting goals (0.4); Central Bank charter does not contain any objective (0.2); Some objectives appear in the charter but price stability is not one of them (0).
More about this variableComponent 3: Policy formulation. Weighted average of the following variables (weights between parentheses): Who formulates monetary policy (0.25); Who has the final decision in monetary policy (0.50), Role of the central bank in the budget process (0.25).
More about this variable1 indicates the year of the law creating the central bank, 0 otherwise.
More about this variable1 indicates the year of a reform that decreased CBI, according to the CBI weighted index, 0 otherwise
More about this variableThe regional diffusion variable in the dataset represents the regional averages of central bank independence (CBI) scores. These averages are calculated for specific regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific. For the estimation of these regional averages, the “Asia and the Pacific” region explicitly excludes the Middle East and former Soviet countries. This variable acts as a strong predictor of the level of CBI in individual countries within the same region, highlighting how regional norms or practices in central bank governance may influence individual countries.
More about this variableEffect of the central bank reform on the CBI weighted index: 1 indicates an increase in CBI; 0 indicates no changes in the level of CBI; 1 indicates the presence of a central bank reform that increased CBI.
More about this variable1 indicates the year of a reform that increased CBI, according to the CBI weighted index, 0 otherwise.
More about this variable1 indicates the year of a reform that affects CBI, 0 otherwise.
More about this variableIndicates whether the central bank is a regional organization (1), or a national central bank (0).
More about this variable