Data on Central Bank Independence

Data source: Davide Romelli

Go to the original dataset webpage

Description:

This dataset provides information on a comprehensive index of CBI covering a wide range of central bank characteristics based on the charters of 154 central banks, over the period from 1972 to 2017. The construction of the index uses, as a starting point, the two most commonly employed CBI indices, namely the Grilli et al. (1991) [GMT] and the Cukierman et al. (1992) [CWN]. This new index, called CBI – extended (CBIE) index, provides information on 42 criteria of central bank institutional design across six dimensions: (1) governor and central bank board, (2) monetary policy and conflict resolution, (3) objectives, (4) limitations on lending to the government, (5) financial independence and (6) reporting and disclosure.

This extended index incorporates the characteristics of both the GMT and CWN indices. Moreover, it expands the GMT political independence index by collecting additional information on the dismissal of the governor and other board members, in addition to identifying if the governor is legally allowed to hold other offices in the government. It also augments the GMT economic independence index by including information on the authority responsible for setting the financial conditions on lending to the government. Apart from integrating these two indices, one important innovation of the CBIE index is the inclusion of new criteria that capture good practices in central bank financial independence and reporting and disclosure.

In addition to the data on the CBIE index, this dataset also provides information on the various subcomponents of the index, updated data on the Grilli et al. (1991), the Cukerman et al. (1992) and the Jacome and Vazquez indices of CBI, as well as a dummy indicating whether the independence of the central bank is entrenched in the constitution.

Last updated by source: 2022-03-04

Dataset type: Time-Series
Dataset level: Country

Citation:

When using this dataset, please cite as:
• Romelli, D. (2022). The political economy of reforms in central bank design: Evidence from a new dataset. Economic Policy, 37(112), 641–688. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011



Variables in this dataset:

   Central Bank's governor and central bank board
QoG Code: cbie_board

Governor and central bank board. Average of the following components: Who appoints the governor, Term of office of the governor, Reappointment option for the governor, Dismissal of governor, Governor allowed to hold another office in government, Qualification requirements for governor, Who appoints the board members, Term of office of board members, Reappointment option for board members, Dismissal of board members, Board members allowed to hold another office in government, Qualification requirements for board members, Staggering term of office for board members, Government representatives in the board. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's governor and central bank board reform
QoG Code: cbie_boardref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Governor and central bank board index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Central bank independence in the constitution
QoG Code: cbie_cbiconstitution

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the degree of independence of the central bank is entrenched in the constitution.

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   Index of central bank independence (Jácome and Vázquez, 2008)
QoG Code: cbie_cwne

Jácome and Vázquez (2008) Index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Financial independence
QoG Code: cbie_finances

Financial independence. Average of the following components: Payment of the initial capital of the central bank, Authorized capital of the central bank, Central bank financial autonomy, Arrangements for automatic recapitalization, Transfers of money from the treasury, Central bank approves its annual budget, Central bank adopt its annual balance sheet, Auditing agency, Allocation of net profits, Allocation of profits to a general reserve fund, Partial payments of dividends before the end of the fiscal year, Unrealized profits included in the calculation of distributable profits. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Financial independence reform
QoG Code: cbie_financesref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Financial independence index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Index of central bank independence (Grilli et al., 1991)
QoG Code: cbie_gmt

Grilli et al. (1991) index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank Independence Extended Index
QoG Code: cbie_index

Average of the scores across these six dimensions of the index, i.e. the raw average of the four components: (1) governor and central bank board, (2) monetary policy and conflict resolution, (3) objectives, (4) limitations on lending to the government, (5) financial independence and (6) reporting and disclosure. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level. This extended index incorporates the characteristics of both the GMT and CWN indices and, includes new criteria that capture good practices in central bank financial independence and reporting and disclosure. This index is in a scale from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates more central bank independence. For more details about the construction of this index, please visit https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article/37/112/641/6516019

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   Central Bank Independence Extended index reform
QoG Code: cbie_indexref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Central Bank's Limitations on lending to the government
QoG Code: cbie_lending

Limitations on lending to the government. Average of the following components: Direct credit: not automatic, Direct credit: market for lending, Who decides financing conditions to government, Beneficiaries of central bank lending, Direct credit: type of limit, Direct credit: maturity of loans, Direct credit: interest rates, Prohibition from buying government securities in primary market. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Limitations on lending to the government reform
QoG Code: cbie_lendingref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Limitations on lending to the government index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Index of central bank independence (Cukierman et al., 1992)
QoG Code: cbie_lvau

Cukierman et al. (1992) Unweighted Index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Objectives
QoG Code: cbie_obj

Objectives. Provides information on the central bank’s statutory goals. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Objectives reform
QoG Code: cbie_objref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Objectives index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Central Bank's Monetary policy and conflicts resolution
QoG Code: cbie_policy

Monetary policy and conflicts resolution. Average of the following components: Who formulates monetary policy, Central bank responsible to fix key policy rates, Banking sector supervision, Central bank role in government’s budget and/or debt, Final authority in monetary policy. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Monetary policy and conflicts resolution reform
QoG Code: cbie_policyref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Monetary policy and conflicts resolution index has changed between year t and t-1.

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   Central Bank's Reporting and disclosure
QoG Code: cbie_report

Financial independence. Average of the following components: Central bank reporting, Central bank financial statements. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.

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   Central Bank's Reporting and disclosure reform
QoG Code: cbie_reportref

Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Financial independence index has changed between year t and t-1.

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