Data source: Davide Romelli
This dataset provides information on a comprehensive index of CBI covering a wide range of central bank characteristics based on the charters of 155 central banks, over the period from 1923 (or the year in which the first legislation was available for a country) to 2023. The construction of the index uses, as a starting point, the two most commonly employed CBI indices, namely the Grilli et al. (1991) [GMT] and the Cukierman et al. (1992) [CWN]. This new index, called CBI – extended (CBIE) index, provides information on 42 criteria of central bank institutional design across six dimensions: (1) governor and central bank board, (2) monetary policy and conflict resolution, (3) objectives, (4) limitations on lending to the government, (5) financial independence and (6) reporting and disclosure.
This extended index incorporates the characteristics of both the GMT and CWN indices. Moreover, it expands the GMT political independence index by collecting additional information on the dismissal of the governor and other board members, in addition to identifying if the governor is legally allowed to hold other offices in the government. It also augments the GMT economic independence index by including information on the authority responsible for setting the financial conditions on lending to the government. Apart from integrating these two indices, one important innovation of the CBIE index is the inclusion of new criteria that capture good practices in central bank financial independence and reporting and disclosure.
In addition to the data on the CBIE index, this dataset also provides information on the various subcomponents of the index, updated data on the Grilli et al. (1991), the Cukerman et al. (1992) and the Jacome and Vazquez indices of CBI, as well as a dummy indicating whether the independence of the central bank is entrenched in the constitution.
When using this dataset, please cite as:
(Romelli, 2022)
(Romelli, 2024)
Browse variables and select them for download.
cbie_board
Governor and central bank board. Average of the following components: Who appoints the governor, Term of office of the governor, Reappointment option for the governor, Dismissal of governor, Gover ...
cbie_boardref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Governor and central bank board index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_cbiconstitution
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the degree of independence of the central bank is entrenched in the constitution.
cbie_cwne
Jácome and Vázquez (2008) Index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.
cbie_finances
Financial independence. Average of the following components: Payment of the initial capital of the central bank, Authorized capital of the central bank, Central bank financial autonomy, Arrangemen ...
cbie_financesref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Financial independence index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_gmt
Grilli et al. (1991) index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.
cbie_index
Average of the scores across these six dimensions of the index, i.e. the raw average of the four components: (1) governor and central bank board, (2) monetary policy and conflict resolution, (3) ...
cbie_indexref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_lending
Limitations on lending to the government. Average of the following components: Direct credit: not automatic, Direct credit: market for lending, Who decides financing conditions to government, Bene ...
cbie_lendingref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Limitations on lending to the government index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_lvau
Cukierman et al. (1992) Unweighted Index of central bank independence. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.
cbie_obj
Objectives. Provides information on the central bank’s statutory goals. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of independence to 1, the highest level.
cbie_objref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Objectives index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_policy
Monetary policy and conflicts resolution. Average of the following components: Who formulates monetary policy, Central bank responsible to fix key policy rates, Banking sector supervision, Central ban ...
cbie_policyref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Monetary policy and conflicts resolution index has changed between year t and t-1.
cbie_report
Financial independence. Average of the following components: Central bank reporting, Central bank financial statements. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the lowest level of inde ...
cbie_reportref
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CBIE - Financial independence index has changed between year t and t-1.