The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Data source: Persson and Tabellini

Description:

Persson and Tabellini only include countries of democratic rule in their sample. To be included in the cross-section, an average of the Freedom House indices for civil liberties and political rights (fh_cl and fh_pr) lower than an average of 5 for the 1990-1998 period is required. For the 1960- 1998 panel data, Persson and Tabellini include country-years that obtain a score greater than zero on the Polity democracy indicator (p_polity2) (For details, see Persson and Tabellini 2003, 74- 77).

Last updated by source: 2012-05-26

Dataset type:	Time-Series
Dataset level:	Country

Citation:

When using this dataset, please cite as:

• Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (2003). The economic effects of constitutions. MIT Press.

    @book{pt1,
 author = {Torsten Persson and Guido Enrico Tabellini},
 note = {Munich Lectures in Economics},
 publisher = {MIT Press},
 title = {The Economic Effects of Constitutions},
 year = {2003}
}

Variables in this dataset:

Federal Political Structure

QoG Code: pt_federal

Dummy variable: 1. If the country has a federal political structure 0. Otherwise

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Majoritarian Electoral Systems

QoG Code: pt_maj

Dummy variable: 1. The lower house is selected under plurality rule 0. Otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered.

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Forms of Government

QoG Code: pt_pres

Dummy variable: 1. For presidential regimes 0. Otherwise. Only regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classified as parliamentary.

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