Centripetal Democratic Governance

Data source: Gerring, Thacker and Moreno

Description:

Data used in the book "A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance" (Gerring, John and Thacker, Strom C, 2008).

Last updated by source: 2008-06-12

Dataset type:	Time-Series
Dataset level:	Country

Citation:

When using this dataset, please cite as:

• Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C., & Moreno, C. (2005). Centripetal democratic governance: A theory and global inquiry. American Political Science Review, 99(4), 567–581. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038965

    @article{gtm1,
 author = {John Gerring and Strom C. Thacker and Carola Moreno},
 issn = {00030554, 15375943},
 journal = {American Political Science Review},
 number = {4},
 pages = {567-581},
 publisher = {[American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press]},
 title = {Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry},
 url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038965},
 volume = {99},
 year = {2005}
}

Variables in this dataset:

Parliamentarism

QoG Code: gtm_parl

The parliamentary/presidential distinction is conceptualized as a continuum with two dimensions: (a) the degree of separation (independence) between president and parliament (unity = parliamentary, separation = presidential) and, if there is any separation at all, (b) the relative power of the two players (the more power the president possesses, the more presidential is the resulting system). This complex reality is captured with a three-part coding scheme: 0. Presidential 1. Semi-presidential 2. Parliamentary

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Proportional Representation

QoG Code: gtm_pr

The centripetal theory of democratic governance emphasizes the following three features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules (majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type is defined by M>1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate selection. This is the closed-list-PR electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. Thus, the coding for the list-PR variable is as follows: 0. Majoritarian or Preferential-vote. 1. Mixed-member majority or Block vote. 2. Closed-list-PR.

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Unitarism

QoG Code: gtm_unit

Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism: Nonfederalism is coded as 0 = federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational authority), 1 = semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), or 2 = non-federal. Nonbicameralism is coded as 0 = strong bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power; the two houses are incongruent), 1 = weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power, though not necessarily a formal veto; the two houses are congruent), or 2 = unicameral (no upper house or weak upper house).

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