Data source: Witold Henisz
The measure of political constraints estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy) using the following methodology. First, extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy change. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
When using this dataset, please cite as:
(h0?)
(Henisz, 2017)
Browse variables and select them for download.
h_alignl1
Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislativ ...
h_alignl1l2
Dummy variable indicating alignment between the legislative chambers, coded 1 when the same party or a coalition of parties (when available) control a majority in both legislative chambers.
h_alignl2
Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislativ ...
h_f
Dummy variable coded 1 if there are independent sub-federal units (states, provinces, regions etc.) that impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy.
h_j
Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an independent judiciary (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst) and - where available - on ICRG's index of Law \& Order.
h_l1
Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective legislative chamber (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst).
h_l2
Dummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective second legislative chamber, namely, where h_l1=1 and records on the composition of a second chamber exist - where that chamber is elected under a distin ...
h_lflo
Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties.
h_lfup
Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the upper legislative chamber will be from different parties.
h_polcon3
This index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the prefer-ences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed ...
h_polcon5
This index follows the same logic as Political Constraints Index III (h_polcon3) but also includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and sub-federal entities. Note that the coding reflects in- ...