The measure of political constraints estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy) using the following methodology. First, extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy change. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
Last updated by source: 2022-10-14
| Dataset type: | Time-Series |
| Dataset level: | Country |
(Henisz, 2017)
(Henisz, 2002)
Dummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.
More about this variableDummy variable indicating alignment between the legislative chambers, coded 1 when the same party or a coalition of parties (when available) control a majority in both legislative chambers.
More about this variableDummy variable indicating alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber, coded 1 when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.
More about this variableDummy variable coded 1 if there are independent sub-federal units (states, provinces, regions etc.) that impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy.
More about this variableDummy variable coded 1 if there is an independent judiciary (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst) and - where available - on ICRG's index of Law \& Order.
More about this variableDummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective legislative chamber (based on information from Polity's Executive Constraints, p_xconst).
More about this variableDummy variable coded 1 if there is an effective second legislative chamber, namely, where h_l1=1 and records on the composition of a second chamber exist - where that chamber is elected under a distinct electoral system and has a substantive (not merely delaying) role in the implementation of fiscal policy.
More about this variableLegislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower legislative chamber will be from different parties.
More about this variableLegislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the upper legislative chamber will be from different parties.
More about this variableThis index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the prefer-ences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus less feasibility of policy change. Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2002) uses this index to demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.
More about this variableThis index follows the same logic as Political Constraints Index III (h_polcon3) but also includes two additional veto points: the judiciary and sub-federal entities. Note that the coding reflects in-formation as of January 1 in any given year. Henisz (2000) uses this index to measure the impact on cross-national growth rates of a government's ability to provide credible commitment.
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